Powell, Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Nuclear Proliferation and National Missile Defence

Argues basically that nuclear states coerce each other by demonstrating resolve. The paradox is that neither side can credibly decide to launch an attack because that would be to impose enormous costs upon itself. So how do states coerce each other in this deterrent balance? Powell argues by resolve. States know there is some risk if events 'spiraling out of control' with command and control systems that decentraising decision-making to come extent. States therefore bargain with the risk they are willing to take that events will spiral out of control. The higher a states resolve, higher risk it's willing to take. Crises are at a higher risk of spiralling out of control when both sides are uncertain about the others resolve. They will engage in brinkmanship and may continue to push each other over the edge? Not sure abhout this.

Anyway, Powell makes some predictions about proliferation, NMD and rouge states. Proliferation will reduce the US ability for regime change. NMD will increase the US resolve, and unless its very effective, increase the probability of an exchange. Rouge states are difficult to deter because their have a higher perceived level of resolve.

'NMD is likely to raise the risk of a nuclear attack on the United States in a confrontation with a rouge" (110).

"To the extent that missile defences help to create more freedom of action for the United States and helpit to acheive its ends in a confrontation, they do so by increasing the United State's effective resolve. As a result, the United States is willing to push the crisis harder: It is more likely to intervene, and is willing to run a higher risk of events spiralling out of control. But there is a price to be paid. As missile defences increase US resolve, the balance of resolve blurs, and the probability of a nuclear strike on the United States rises". (111).

"in situations in which the balance of resolve is very clearly in Cavour of a small nuclear state, brinkmanship indicates that they small state will be able to deter the United States. Consequently, the spread of nuclear weapons is likely to give the regime of a small nuclear state - whether rouge or not - the ability to deter the United States from trying to overthrow that regime". (112).