Aerial Power

Byamn and Waxman,

Argue that air power is successful when combined with other factors. There are a number of reasons why Bosnia capitulated, and air power was one of them. There were five causes of Milosevic's stand-down, according to the authors, and air-power played a greater or lesser role in each. Firstly, air power can be used to foment internal dissent by reducing infrastructure and bombing strategic installations. This might convince some groups within the party that pursuing the current course is unsustainable and that the leader must go. On the other hand, bombing can galvanise populations and elites. Air power is no guarantee of internal dissent. Secondly, air power can be used to destroy the military capabilities of a coerced state - but again, there is a caveat. Its efficacy depends upon the strategy employed by the coerced state. Air power is good for knocking out concentrations, but not so good for sorting between civilians and government soldiers. If the policy is ethnic cleansing - air power might not help. Air power can increase the perception that the coercing states have a high level of resolve. It might increase the perception that a ground-invasion is imminent, and given the efficacy of air power in knocking out conventional military structures, would likely be damaging to the coerced state. But is this the case? Or might the use of air power communicate that a state is not willing to go any further? Might its use as a 'cost-free' means of deterrence undermine its credibility? Might states only use it when they lack resolve to put ground troops in?

Air power can have a multiplier effect (or its effects can be neutralized) if the coerced state is able to deflect some of the damage or impose costs upon the coercer. Bosnia could not. It could not strike the NATO aircraft, but it also could not drive a wedge between NATO. Russia did not come onside, meaning that Serbia was unable to garner allies (that might have provided the wedge and a brake on the bombings).

The final way in which air power might have led to Milosevic's capitulation was by increasesing the threat of a KLA victory. The authors conclude that this was only minor in this case, and the use of aerial bombing to improve the relative military capabilities of an insurgency can only work where there exists a credible indigenous opposition. You also want to be careful of who you are getting into bed with (there were some unsavoury characters in the KLA).